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Response to my Commentators
THE PRECEDING commentaries by Richard Connors, Lisa Cody, John
Smail, and Rachel Weil offer an invaluable perspective from which to
rethink some major features of my study. I will discuss what seem to me
the most important of these, both clarifying my ideas and elaborating
them in directions these commentaries have fruitfully opened up.
Halfway through the composition of The Secret History of Domesticity:
Public, Private, and the Division of Knowledge I became aware of a motive
for writing that had long been latent in my thinking about seventeenth-
and eighteenth-century British history, but only at this point could be
articulated. For decades the period from 1650 to 1800, loosely enclosed
within the category of “the Enlightenment,” has been criticized for
bearing the seeds of much that is wrong with modernity in the West; by
this account, it is only through such relatively recent revisionism that the
bane of Enlightenment thinking has been moderated. Yet it was clear to
me that the late modern critique of the Enlightenment derives its
method and force from the Enlightenment itself, which in many ways
had never really ended. This much had consciously informed my work
for many years. What I now came to see was that The Secret History
attempted to address this misconception by the disarmingly simple strategy
of “view[ing] the past not only as a prelude to our present but also as a
response to its own past”: not only as vulnerable to future criticism, but
also as a powerfully critical reaction against the hand history had dealt it
(p. xxvii). To put this another way, without denying the need to explain
the early modern period in terms that were not its own, I also wanted
to interpret it in terms that its contemporaries would have recognized as
familiar and plausible.
Invaluable as historical method, in application the distinction between
“explanation” and “interpretation” is complicated and variable. In The
Secret History I have found it imperative to summarize my argument in
a number of abstract, “explanatory” frameworks that as historical general-
izations inevitably exceed the perspective of the culture they describe.
No doubt the most important of these generalizations is the triad
distinction/separation/conflation. The first of these terms stands for the
way “traditional” English culture conceives and experiences some of the
central categories of existence — public and private, but also state and
civil society, society and individual, polity and economy, status and class,
sex and gender, family honour and personal virtue, cultural and personal
religion, supernatural dispensations and empirical sense impressions, the
didactic and the aesthetic — as “distinct” but inseparable from one
another. In the period of my major concern, however, these paired cat-
egories come to seem, and to be lived as, fully separable, participating in
a modern “separation out” that is the necessary precondition for the
modern and critical “conflation” of supposedly separate categories that
begins in the Enlightenment and continues to fuel what is wrongly
thought to be the anti-Enlightenment impulse of late modernity. So, as
Rachel Weil suggests, what I call the “Age of Separations” is therefore
also the “Age of Conflations.” (On the face of it, distinction and conflation
share a centripetal or unifying principle. However, because it is premised
on the separation it undertakes to criticize, modern conflation is a self-
conscious process that brings together categories explicitly understood to
be free-standing, and it is therefore very different from the traditional con-
dition of distinction, of which the unifying principle is prior and tacit
because it is grounded in the unthinkability of separation.)
If explanatory schemes like distinction/separation/conflation exceed the
self-understanding of early modern English people, they also help clarify
the nature of the changes that occurred in this period and the motives
by which contemporaries either celebrated or condemned those changes.
Explanatory formulations are fruitful, in other words, because of the
role they play in the dialectical process by which broad heuristic hypoth-
eses invite the sort of substantiation, correction, or complication that can
be found only through the closely focused interpretation of textual evi-
dence. Abstraction is not only the antithesis of concretion but also its pre-
condition. My commentators are acute on the way explanatory
generalization and interpretive particularity intersect in my argument.
Given the importance of abstraction in both my method and my account
of its historical object, I am grateful to them most of all, perhaps, for
the success with which they have evoked the range, variety, and detail of
particular kinds of evidence in The Secret History, which I adduce not
simply for their reciprocal confirmation through accretion and overlay
but also, in their local disparities, to thicken and variegate the texture of
the abstraction that encloses them. Richard Connors has done a special
service by contextualizing my work within an ample and thoughtful
selection of studies by others on several of the topics I treat, helpfully
documenting the fact that The Secret History enters into discussions
that well precede it and that often enough diverge from its own claims
and conclusions.
I now turn to clarification. In breaking down the middle term of my
triad, “separation,” in the first part of The Secret History, I rely on the
notion of a “devolution of absolutism” whereby the public, sovereign auth-
ority that is tacitly and unconditionally a possession of absolute monarchy
is gradually detached from monarchy and associated with a number of
lesser, relatively more “private” entities. John Smail identifies the major
contenders — representative democracy, self-interest, the household, the
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economy, the family, women, the ethical subject or “sovereign self,”
conscience, the imagination, sex — with a cogency that not only separates
them on a spectrum of increasing privatization and internalization but
also is mindful of their analogical ties to one another. In the third part
of The Secret History, I focus on a major literary enactment of this devolu-
tion from the realm of traditional publicness to the emergent realm of mul-
tiple privacies, the emergence of the (domestic) novel in the eighteenth
century. In the second part of my study, I propose a framework for under-
standing the domestic novel as the formal product of seventeenth-century
modifications of the genre of the secret history, a formal change that
reflects more general transformations in hermeneutic and pedagogic
method.
“Domestication” is the term I use to denote the tendency in all tra-
ditional modes of textual interpretation to use the “low,” trivial, but fam-
iliar categories of local, personal, and common experience as a means of
signifying or accommodating the momentous, “elevated,” but therefore
scarcely accessible signifiers of public — of political and theological —
teaching. “Domesticity” is the term I use to denote the end point of the
interpretive process of domestication, a point of reversal whereby suffi-
cient value is acknowledged to reside in the immanence of “low” experi-
ence itself to give it the status of its own signified and to preclude
altogether the necessity of low-to-high signification. Smail is right to see
this change as, broadly speaking, an example of the historical devolution
of absolutism. It is important to add, however, that strictly speaking dom-
estication is not a fluid historical process but a stabilizing technique of
reading and teaching, not an engine of devolution but a bulwark against
it. Because domestication is thus grounded in a hierarchical subordination
of the “low” to the “high,” only at the notional moment when the value
system of domestication is replaced by that of domesticity can we see, as
it were retrospectively, domestication as authorizing the devolution of an
absolute norm from high to low, from the public to the private realm of
experience.
Lisa Cody concentrates her attention on the more private and interior-
ized stages of the devolution of absolutism, in particular the categories of
subjectivity and the imagination and “the ‘secret’ of sex,” and she thought-
fully extends my speculations on the shifting relationship between
“secrecy” and “privacy” during the early modern period. It might seem
paradoxical, Cody observes, that the capacity for imaginative identification
with another person should become normative (through writers like Adam
Smith and Jane Austen) at a time when the fundamental difference
between individuals and especially the sexes was also becoming conven-
tional wisdom. In explaining this paradox, Cody illuminates the crucial dia-
lectic of modern conflation, which became possible only when traditionally
distinct categories had come to appear sufficiently separable from each
other to be autonomous entities and therefore conflatable.
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The emergent authority of “sex” at this time can appear inflated if we
treat it as the single standard-bearer of modern privacy rather than as
one part of a greater whole. To isolate sex as the secret, that is, risks obscur-
ing its status as only one component — oppositionally separated most
importantly from political and economic self-interest — in the more
general category of human desire, whose positive revaluation during the
Enlightenment must appear counterintuitive to those who believe postmo-
dern thought is the antithesis of Enlightenment thinking. In fact, Cody
does justice to the co-implication of sex with other categories of desire,
centrally the imagination. In her bold extension of my reading of
Campi’s Martha and Mary painting, Cody documents the semantic plas-
ticity of “the imagination,” “sex,” and “the subject” a century-and-a-half
before the first is positively revalued as a faculty beyond both sin and
the senses, the second becomes naturalized as sex “as such,” and the
third sheds its primary association with subjection and takes on the
modern colouring of subjectivity.
The subdivision of “desire” into sex, interest, the imagination, secrecy,
privacy, and the like evokes a process I argue is evident in much of the
history with which I am concerned and that Weil lucidly explains —
namely, the tendency of categories, once separated into their public and
private components, to replicate within the new realm of privacy a
further subdivision of the sort that gave rise to it. An especially arresting
instance of this, a species of privacy that devolves from absolute sover-
eignty, is the Habermasian category “the public” — not the traditional
publicness of royal state rule, but that of the public sphere, public
opinion, the public interest, the reading public, the public domain, the
republic of letters — a collectively imagined or virtual realm through
which private individuals exercise actual political and cultural power. To
Weil’s discussion I would add only that the emergence of this innovative
category of virtual publicness depended on the simultaneous and recipro-
cal emergence of the equally unprecedented notion of privacy itself. For
“traditional” communities, authority is a top-down affair that begins
with God or monarch and is exercised on the relatively undifferentiated
mass of commoners who, in a condition of privation rather than privacy,
are subjected to it. By the end of the eighteenth century, authority
instead derived increasingly from an indefinite multiplicity of actual indi-
viduals, political and ethical subjects, whose manifold private desires it
was the job of virtual publics (not only the public sphere but also,
notably, representative political bodies and the market) to accommodate
and reconcile. If explanatory schemes — like my “devolution of absolut-
ism” (or contemporaries’ “state versus civil society”) — are needed to gen-
erate interpretable examples, the particularity of examples is reciprocally
needed to sharpen the adequacy of explanation.
As Smail observes, The Secret History is a historical investigation of how
nothing less than epistemology, or modes of knowing, developed in this
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period, which is one reason why the “disciplinary” scope of its analysis
needs to be as wide as it is. But if epistemology is germane not only to
what we would call philosophy but also to economics, religion, political
theory, literature, science, and the like, epistemology itself owes its expla-
natory power to its relatively recent separation and autonomization — its
explicitation — as a privileged window onto the world. The modern auth-
ority of epistemology expresses a profound readjustment of focus from the
a priori premise that the existence of fundamental categories is given, to
the empirical process by which their existence makes a claim on our atten-
tion. This is a shift from the “what” to the “how,” from the object to the
subject, but it also revalues “objecthood,” if not as presupposed as first
principle, then as the crucial evidentiary basis for empirically derived sup-
positions. The discipline of history comes into its own when it embraces the
methodological requirement that knowledge of the past be grounded in
“texts” whose objectivity, even in the most inclusive sense of that term,
is also a function of subjective interpretation — that is, interpretation by
a subject.
Although to different degrees, two of my commentators raise a question
that is central to historical method as such, but is made perhaps more than
usually pressing by the way I proceed in The Secret History. This is the
question of what Smail calls “intent and causation” and Weil calls “caus-
ality and agency.” For Smail, problems might be said to arise in relation
to the fact that The Secret History is an intellectual history, focused on
the way contemporaries think about or “know” the political, social, and
economic world they inhabit, and is therefore limited, by this focus, to
the analysis of written texts that are representative and expressive of
that worldly experience but not causally instrumental in bringing it
about. For Weil, problems coalesce around the frequency and explicitness
with which I recur to abstract formulations that appear to explain historical
change by reference to the agency of nothing more concrete or explana-
tory than conceptual categories or thought itself. These misgivings go to
the heart of my project and invite a return to the heuristic distinction
between explanation and interpretation.
At one extreme, the question of causation is one of abstract and external
determination; at the other, it is one of concrete and internal agency,
intent, and motive, and both Smail and Weil wonder whether, in their
locality and particularity, the latter tend to fly under the radar of my pro-
cedure. Yet if that procedure involves a methodological reciprocity of the
general and the particular of the sort I have described, one would expect
that matters of individual agency would be voiced with some frequency in
The Secret History, and I think they are. Weil’s framing account of Queen
Anne’s female favourites rightly reminds us that contemporaries construed
the public/private divide “in accordance with political needs.” Here and
elsewhere, however, I assume readers will know that the porosity of that
divide, witnessed in a wealth of particular encounters, was exploited by
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many contemporaries for reasons of power and self-interest. It is also
important to see not only that the general fact of the divide’s porosity
cannot be explained at this local level of political and personal motive,
but also that our assumptions about political and personal motive
may be skewed if detached from the broad cultural phenomenon of a
highly experimental approach to the public-private relationship. Citing
my defence of Jane Austen’s domesticity, Weil asks whether Mary
Wollstonecraft therefore should be challenged for “condemning the nar-
rowness of the education and life course open to middle-class women.”
For Wollstonecraft, however, domesticity — the condition of “affectionate
wives and rational mothers” — is, if anything, responsible not for the
problem of a narrow female education but for its mitigation. To assess
the attitudes of contemporaries toward the emergent institution of domes-
ticity we may need to attend less to historical hindsight and more to the
status of women that domesticity would replace — in Wollstonecraft’s
account, the status of “alluring mistresses” (see The Secret History,
p. 187). Smail’s question about agency — was Eliza Haywood consciously
“driving forward the processes of domestication and devolution” that were
subserved by her local actions? — seems to me both interesting and unans-
werable in its own terms. What sort of language would support this reading
of active agency, as opposed to the view that Haywood was passively
“picking up on currents in the culture around her”? Is the dichotomous
form of the question perhaps a hindrance rather than a help in getting
at how individuals inhabit transitional cultures?
What about the other extreme of causation, that of abstract and external
determination? Throughout The Secret History there runs an uneven but
continuous analogy between the modern division of knowledge and
the modern division of labour. Laying out the terms of my argument
(pp. xviii–xix), I propose (with Marx) that the history I will pursue is
the history both of abstract conceptual categories and of concrete material
experience and practice, and that the development and complication of the
latter is the precondition for the recognition and articulation of the former.
For the most part, however, Smail and Weil are right to see that my interest
in the divisions of knowledge and labour concerns less their causal or
explanatory relationship than the balance of similarity and difference
that is evident in their analogical or structural relationship (for example,
pp. 325–327). Noting my micro-causal thesis that James I’s warning to
Parliament against looking into the limits of his power led Parliament to
do just that, Smail advances toward the sort of macro-level question that
I tend to avoid: “But why does James warn in the first place?” Citing
my metaphorical account of how the tradition of “domestication” is
succeeded by the innovation of “domesticity,” Weil suspects that the
macro-causal question is “answered” here on the level of words or con-
cepts, not history. These are fair complaints. I shy away from such ques-
tions in part because I think the ultimate determinacy of the material
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over the conceptual, or vice versa, is an ontological and a political
conviction that is fundamentally insusceptible to empirical demonstration.
But my reluctance to propose macro-causal explanations also owes to the
fact that the availability of the causal formulation itself — which explains
which, social being or consciousness? — is a product of the great process
of “separation out” that is my topic in The Secret History and that is inter-
twined with other modern divisions, like that between explanation and
interpretation, quantity and quality, science and the humanities, and the
like. (As in the case of the public and the private, of course, in all of
these instances the modern separations derive from earlier distinctions.
In their insistence they also replace earlier determinacies, like that of
the creature by the Creator or of flesh by spirit, that were ceasing to
exert their erstwhile explanatory force.) In other words, I am reluctant
to ask, let alone to answer, the macro-causal question because to do so
would be to deploy too quickly and easily a habit of inquiry whose delicate
emergence into the realm of the plausible at this time it is my ambition to
throw into relief.
As Smail implies, my denial of any “chronology” to the major develop-
ments I take up in Part I of The Secret History aims to obviate a thesis of
propter hoc causal determinacy based on post hoc temporal difference. To
my mind, this is not to deny as well “the possibility of any contingent
relationships between these developments.” On the contrary, the multiple
interdependence of things tends to flourish most openly in the absence of a
single and overarching scheme of dependence. Of the conflationary
responses to the modern separation of the material and the conceptual
that are formulated soon after the period of my concern, Marx’s dialectical
method seems to me best able to sustain the relatively new-found
authority of material causation without sacrificing the apprehension of his-
torical contingency that is the most valuable product of the separation of
the material from the conceptual.
What remains, once causal explanation is bracketed, is analogical
relationship. For contemporaries, the dense thicket of analogical relation,
grounded in the emergent relation of matter and concept, labour and
knowledge, connects the multiplicity of phenomena within the domains
that we separate out as society, politics, economy, religion, family,
gender, and sex. On one hand, this way of thinking sustains an early
modern ontology of correspondence that has much in common with the
traditional culture of distinction-without-separation. On the other hand,
the insight of analogical relation has a valuable lesson to teach modern his-
torians, we who work and think in a culture of separability. Weil suggests
this with gratifying point when she says that I “put issues of domesticity
and privacy that gender historians tend to think of as being about
gender into a wider political and historical context. It is healthy and chal-
lenging to be reminded that the categories of public and private did not, or
not just, come into being as weapons in a class or gender-political
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struggle.” This is the best justification, I think, for the mode of history (like
The Secret History) that has been largely denigrated as that of the “master
narrative.” If they work as they should, master narratives are neither
random heaps of facts nor monological reductions of multiplicity to simpli-
city, but stories told with enough detail to render moot the question of
whether this is one story or many.
Michael McKeon
Rutgers University
444 Histoire sociale / Social History
